"I have made it abundantly clear to the Coast
Guard that we will turn back any refugee that attempts to reach our shore" 1 .
I. Introduction
This declaration of US President G.W. Bush is symptomatic of how sea-borne migration is perceived as a problem or even hassle by the destination states despite the presence of refugees in dire need of protection. Some times states deny the refugee character of a flow of migrants or invoke security concerns to refuse protection and to justify the nonadmittance or the removal. Arrivals by sea of asylum-seekers challenge not only the interpretation and application of the right of asylum, and in particular the principle of non-refoulement, but also the existing rules related to the freedom and the safety of navigation.
Migration flows by sea are not a new phenomenon and ever since the Indochinese crisis 2 in the seventies, they are well known under the expression "boat people". Dealing with arrivals of thousands of Vietnamese irregular migrants to the coasts of neighboring states, the international community was forced to notice that international law had a gap: it had no useful and effective instruments to deal with migrants at sea, and in particular with asylum-seekers.
The chief problems that still remain have been to identify the rights and the obligations of the concerned states 3 in the different maritime zones with special regard to the organization and management of search and rescue operations at sea. Another important issue has been the question whether the decision of states to refuse the permission of entry into their territory is legally limited. This question arose mainly in relation to the treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees -possibly among the migrants -with regard to the principle of non-refoulement.
This article elucidates how the exercise of sovereign powers in the different maritime zones pursuant to the law of the sea and customary international law gives rise to challenges in the application of the principle of non-refoulement and in the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees at sea. Particular attention must be given to the so-called nonentrée mechanisms made principally to prevent a refugee having access to the procedures for the determination of his/her status. Among those are the interdiction at sea programs.
The analysis will not be limited to the modalities of exercising jurisdiction; their consequences must also be considered. In fact, one of the main difficulties related to the management of refugees by sea consists in the heterogeneity of the phenomenon. Case law and practice testify that each arrival is different from another. This contribution argues that there is a common aim underlying both the law of the sea and refugee law which thus can be combined in accounting for security interests of the states as well as the protection of sea-borne asylum-seekers.
The argument unfolds in five steps. First, the content and evolution of the principle of non-refoulement will be analyzed (II.). Then, the difficulties related to its application in the territorial waters will be highlighted (III.). Specific remarks will be made for the contiguous zone (IV.). Particular attention will be given to interdiction programs on the high seas (V.). The contribution will conclude with some critical remarks (VI.) that must be taken into account when interpreting the law of the sea and refugee law with regard to sea-borne asylum-seekers. individuals or their state of origin; the flag state of the vessel carrying the asylum-seekers; eventually the state of transit or first port of asylum.
II. The Legal Nature of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Towards the Recognition of a Peremptory Norm?
The Meaning of the Principle Pursuant to Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention
The principle of non-refoulement is expressed firstly in article 33(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) 4 which states that: "1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".
First and foremost this article establishes an obligation for states not to remove individuals or a certain group of persons present in their territory to the country of persecution. Two main issues arise from the application of this norm: first, when the rejection of an individual can lead to the violation of the principle of non-refoulement and, secondly, who are the individuals protected by this norm.
The obligation of non-refoulement is the core of asylum-seekers protection 5 because it is the only guarantee that refugees will not be submitted again to the persecution which has caused the departure and responds to the refugee's need to enter the asylum country. It does not, however, explicitly guarantee access to the territory of the destination state or admission to the procedures granting the refugee status. Actually some authors have tried to support the existence of an additional obligation aimed at binding states to admit individuals applying for protection into their own territory but, for the moment, state practice cannot confirm these attempts 6 . 4 UNTS Vol. 189 No. 150, page 137 et seq. I do not consider here the issues related to the application of the principle of non-refoulement in a situation of expulsion from the territory of the hosting state, i.e. after the decision of the competent authorities to not admit the individual to the relevant procedures or the refusal of granting the status of refugee; situations implying other legal problems and consequences despite the phenomenon of sea-borne asylum-seekers. See G.S.
Recently, Noll gave a very interesting definition of the principle, which summarizes its evolution from the letter of article 33 to today's approach: "Non-refoulement is about being admitted to the State community, although in a minimalist form of non-removal. It could be described as a right to transgress an administrative border" (emphasis added) 7 . Starting from this conception some important consequences for the legality of the control carried out at the borders and where they must or may take place may be considered.
The application of the principle of non-refoulement at the frontier, in its meaning of "non rejection at the frontier", is mostly shared today 8 , but, as it will be discussed below, its application to interdiction operations on the high seas or within territorial waters is less clear 9 because of the difficulties related to the determination of the moment of entry into the territory for sea-borne asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, the unlawful entry of asylum-seekers does not exclude them from the scope of application of the non-refoulement principle as guaranteed in article 31(1) 1951 Refugee Convention 10 . During the Indochinese crisis, the UNHCR Executive Committee (Executive Committee) affirmed:
Goodwin-Gill/ J. Adam 15 the Executive Committee has brought forward this argument restating it in relation to migration by sea in 1979, as follows:
t is the humanitarian obligation of all coastal States to allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their waters and to grant asylum, or at least temporary refuge, to persons on board wishing to seek asylum" 16 .
The UNHCR has played an important role both in the evolution of the principle of non-refoulement to include cases of rejection at the frontier as well as in the evolution of the interpretation of article 33 in relation to the category of individuals protected by this norm. Actually, there exists a discrepancy between the ratione personae application of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the content of the mandate of the UNHCR 17 . The scope of its mandate has expanded progressively since its creation and comprises now the protection of five categories of individuals: 1.) those falling under the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol (see below); 2.) broader categories recognized by states as entitled to protection and assistance of the UNHCR; 3.) those individuals for whom the UNHCR exercised "good offices"; 4.) returning refugees; 5.) non-refugee stateless persons 18 .
On the contrary, article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention applies to the so-called "statutory refugee", i.e. the individuals within the definition provided by article 1 of the same Convention, as modified by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1967 Protocol) 19 :
"[the term refugee shall apply to any person who] owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it". (emphasis added)
The cornerstone of this definition is the concept of "well-founded fear of being persecuted" which restrains the Convention's ambit of application compared to the mandate of the UNHCR. The meaning of persecution has been thoroughly debated by scholars aiming at enlarging the scope of article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention 20 . State practice is not homogenous in that respect, even if it "has consistently revealed a dominant trend of offering some form of protection to 'per- 18 The preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention recalls the UDHR and the 1967 DTA reaffirming the content of its article 14 clarifying that the individual does not possess a subjective right of asylum but he/she is merely entitled to request the status of a refugee and the required state has a discretionary power to accept or refuse the request 26 . Notwithstanding the discretion of states, preventing an individual from presenting the request can imply a breach of article 14 UDHR in its meaning of "right to request" which is safeguarded by the principle of non-refoulement. The 1966 ICCPR also provides the obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or return an individual to a country where there are well founded suspicions concerning a risk of irreparable harm to the right to life guaranteed by article 6. 32 The right to life is also guaranteed by article 2 ECHR, article 4 ACHR and article 4 Banjul Charter.
From this list of articles affirming the principle of non-refoulement in relation both to the prohibition of torture and the right to life, it becomes evident how three domains of international law evolve in parallel but often overlap and interact: refugee protection, human rights and humanitarian law on the basis of which an individual can assert a claim for protection towards the respective state as well as the international community as a whole 33 . Goodwin-Gill and Adam support the existence of a customary norm of "temporary refuge", "which prohibit [s] States from forcibly repatriating foreigners who had fled generalized violence and other threats caused by internal armed conflict within their own State, until the violence ceased and the home State could assure the security and the protection of its nationals" 34 . The existence of such a customary norm can be identified, beyond the repetition of the principle of non-refoulement in the above mentioned human rights treaties, in the notion of complementary protection and in the practice of states related to "temporary protection". (ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalized violations of their human rights".
The conception of temporary protection is however not homogenous; the Australian approach 36 , for example, consists of a temporary "protection visa" permitting refugees who have entered unlawfully into the territory to stay pending the determination of their status.
In light of the several international and domestic instruments and of state practice reaffirming the principle of non-refoulement it is today unanimously considered a customary norm, even if complete agreement has not yet been reached concerning its precise content regarding its territorial scope. Because of its close connection with the prohibition of torture, the peremptory nature of the principle of non-refoulement is more often discussed and supported. "2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country".
The Nature of the Principle of Non-Refoulement and its Peremptory Importance
The first attempt to affirm the peremptory nature of the principle of non-refoulement is Conclusion No. 25 (XXXIII) of 1982, in which the UNHCR Executive Committee 39 made a step far beyond the state of the art at the time. Then, in 1989, again the Executive Committee invited states to avoid actions resulting in refoulement situations because these would be "contrary to fundamental prohibitions against these practices" 40 , and in 1996, it reaffirmed the principle elevating it to the rank of peremptory customary law, stating:
"Distressed at the widespread violations of the principle of nonrefoulement and of the rights of refugees, in some cases resulting in loss of refugee lives, and seriously disturbed at reports indicating that large numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers have been refouled and expelled in highly dangerous situations; recalls that the principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation" 41 .
The question strongly re-emerged in 2001, after the attacks of 9/11, when the UN Security Council adopted S/RES/1373 42 where it expressed an "unequivocal condemnation" of the terrorist acts and adopted measures aimed at repressing the funding and the preparation of terrorist attacks. In particular, in operative para. 3, the Security Council invited states to: "(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts; (g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists".
Allain deduced from this text an attempt of the Security Council to modify the content of article 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention stating that an individual found guilty of a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge cannot enjoy statutory protection 43 . Bearing in mind the uncertainty related to the definition of terrorism in international law 44 , and according to the wording of S/RES/1373, a state would be allowed to classify as terrorist an opposing armed group or organization and thus to exclude a priori members of this group from the status determination procedures. Moreover, if the crime of terrorism is equally considered a "serious crime" pursuant to article 33(2), this would have the consequence of allowing the state in which the individual has been found guilty to expel him/her even to the territory where there is a risk of being submitted to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatments; thus having a big impact on the practice concerning non-refoulement 45 . Recognizing the peremptory nature of the non-refoulement principle, as suggested by some authors 46 , it should prevail on instruments of different nature, such as Security Council resolutions or agreements on extradition, when there is a threat of human rights violation.
In the opinion of Orakhelashvili 47 , "doubtful wording of the Council's resolutions must always be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with fundamental international obligations". Pursuant to this approach, and bearing in mind the uncertain definition of terrorism, the application of S/RES/1373 should not imply a changing of the content of article 1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The state of the art is not yet permitted to affirm the peremptory nature of the principle of non-refoulement. The principle remains, however, of peremptory importance as a "tool" for guaranteeing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the prohibition of torture and the protection of fundamental human rights. This is the reason why it is extremely relevant in determining when, where and how sea-borne asylum-seekers are entitled to its protection. 
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III. The Notion of Maritime Frontier for the Purposes of Applying the Principle of Non-Refoulement
The Notion of Maritime Frontier and the Exercise of Sovereign Powers in the Territorial Waters
Article 2(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 48 provides that, "[t]he sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territorial and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea".
This maritime zone cannot exceed the 12 nautical miles (article 3 UNCLOS). The only general exception to the exclusive powers of the coastal state in its territorial sea consists of the right of innocent passage as stated in article 17 UNCLOS 49 . The coastal state shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea (article 24 UNCLOS) but it can regulate the conditions of the passage in the fields listed in article 21(1), inter alia "(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State". (emphasis added)
The coastal state can also prevent a passage which it considers not innocent and suspend the related right in specific areas of its territorial sea when this "is essential for the protection of its security" (article 25(3)). Moreover, the coastal state shall not exercise its criminal jurisdiction on foreign vessels crossing its territorial sea except if the consequences of the offence extend into its territory or if the offence is of a kind to disturb the peace or the security or the good order of the territorial sea (article 27(1)(a)-(b)).
Pursuant to the above-mentioned articles, to enter the territorial waters of a state does not necessarily mean falling under its jurisdiction. The variety of situations is unlimited. A fundamental distinction can be drawn, however, between the instance of a vessel merely exercising its right of innocent passage in the territorial waters of a foreign state without being directed to its coasts, and the situation of a vessel crossing the territorial sea of the coastal state to reach its territory.
In the first situation the coastal state has no jurisdiction on the passing vessel unless it considers the presence of unlawful passengers, the undocumented refugees, as a breach of the conditions for enjoying the right of innocent passage. Consequently, the state could refuse the entry of the vessel into its territorial waters. Such refusal can have consequences for individuals' enjoyment of the right of seeking asylum and the right of non-refoulement. This behavior has the effect of confining the exercise of jurisdiction to the effective borders of the territorial sea; this will be discussed below.
In the second situation, the vessel is manifestly violating domestic immigration law as it is carrying irregular passengers. It is very important to distinguish the kinds of operations carried out by the authorities of the coastal state in the territorial waters. If the operation is aimed at the expulsion of the vessel, the coastal state exercises its power to expel those vessels or persons it considers to have unlawfully entered its territory, namely its territorial sea. It recognizes implicitly that the vessel entered its territory and therefore becomes subject to its jurisdiction. Pursuant to this thinking, the passengers of the vessel enjoy the rights guaranteed by the international obligations binding the interested state in respect to the persons submitted to its jurisdiction, among them are the principle of non-refoulement and fundamental human rights. In particular, article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention applies in this case guaranteeing immunity from penalties to refugees who entered unlawfully into the asylum state 51 .
On the contrary, if the intervention of the coastal state authorities is only aimed at refusing the entry, this implies the movement of the frontier to the area where the operation takes place. The individuals concerned are not yet under its jurisdiction and state authorities are only limited by the principle of non-refoulement in its meaning of non-50 Goodwin-Gill/ Adam, see note 6, 279. 51 The wording of article 31 is reported above, see note 10. See also GoodwinGill/ Adam, see note 6, 274; Hathaway, see note 10, 91.
rejection at the frontier. In this regard, the United States "wet foot/dry foot policy" shows some interesting aspects -it can be summarized as follows:
" This policy is a good example of the so-called "mechanisms of nonentrée" aimed at denying access to the territory through the nonauthorization of entry or through the creation of international zones in which neither domestic nor international law apply 53 . In relation to seaborne asylum-seekers there is the somewhat original Australian "territorial excision" of more than 3,500 of its islands. This is a self declared "migration zone". As pointed out by Hathaway:
he result would be that refugees arriving at one of the excised islands -including not only main destinations for those arriving by boat from Southeast Asia, such as Christmas Island, but even an island only 2 km from the coast of the Australian mainland -would 52 Refugee Convention] applies in terms only to refugees, and a refugee is defined… as someone necessarily "outside the country of his nationality" (…). For good measure, article 33 forbids "refoulement" to "frontier" and, whatever precise meaning is given to the former term, it cannot comprehend an action which causes someone to remain on the same side of the frontier as they began; nor indeed could such a person be said to have been returned to any frontier" (para. 31).
not be entitled to have their claims assessed under Australia's refugee status determination system". 54 The mechanisms of non-entrée do not completely avoid the application of the principle of non-refoulement and an analogy with operations carried out on the high seas can support this approach. As far as the territorial sea is concerned, two behaviors can particularly violate the obligations deriving from the principle in its meaning of non-rejection at the frontier: the refusal of entry into the territorial sea and the denial of access into the port or of disembarkation.
The Refusal of Entry into the Territorial Sea
Pursuant to article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 Vienna Convention) 55 , article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention applies to States parties' territory including the territorial sea. The wording of article 33 confirms this statement as it prohibits refoulement to "the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened" (emphasis added). The use of the term "territories" in the plural, instead of state or nation, indicates the irrelevance of the formal status of the part of the territory concerned 56 and of the state actually exercising its jurisdiction on the territory where the refugee or asylumseeker would be endangered 57 . 54 Hathaway, see note 6, 298, especially footnote 105. Moreover the author defines this mechanisms as a "legal ruse in order to avoid formal acknowledge of the arrival of the refugee" and concludes that " [t] here is (…) no international legal difference between opting not to consider the refugee status of persons present in "international zones" or "excised territory" and refusing to consider the refugee status of persons clearly acknowledged to be on the state's territory. Where the refusal to process a refugee claim results, directly or indirectly, in the refugee's removal to face the risk of being persecuted, Article 33 has been contravened"; ibid., 321-322. Since the first state of arrival has the duty to host refugees, at least temporarily, pursuant to the concept of "territorial asylum" 58 , the vessel transporting refugees cannot be impeded from entering into the territorial sea upon its arrival at the border of the territorial sea, nor can it be refoulé to high seas or to territories where the above-mentioned risks of persecution exists. The regime of "territorial asylum" was conceived and developed during the Indochinese crisis to guarantee minimum standards of protection and a first hosting place; it corresponds to the idea of "temporary refuge". At that time, the notion of a "safe third State" 59 emerged. After their status determination pursuant to the procedures of the state of arrival, the refugees were voluntarily redirected according to the agreement concluded with the "safe third State" 60 . The aim was clearly to share the burden represented by the thousands of refugees and to avoid refusal of entry. Notwithstanding the existence of the temporary refuge rule, states continue to refuse access into their territorial waters invoking the fact that there is no proof of the presence of refugees on board and thus they can justifiably preclude the entry of a vessel. They thereby manifestly violate their immigration law. Two cases are quite self-explanatory in this respect: the case of the Norwe- The Tampa 61 was a Norwegian merchant ship which rescued an Indonesian fishing boat in distress on 26 August 2001 on the high seas. The Tampa had to keep all the 433 passengers of the Indonesian boat on board, notwithstanding that it was formally only allowed to transport 50 persons maximum. Having arrived at 13.5 nautical miles from the Australian island of Christmas, the master had to stop as the Australian authorities denied access into the territorial waters. In light of the health conditions of the passengers, among them pregnant women and wounded men, the master took the decision to contravene the denial and entered the Australian waters looking for sanitary assistance. The vessel stopped 4 miles from the shore. The Australian government sent special army corps to give first medical aid and to avoid the disembarkation of the migrants. The Tampa then refused to leave the territorial waters because of the unsafe situation of the vessel due to the excess of people on board. Finally on 1 September, the Australian government declared that it had reached an agreement with New Zealand and transferred the passengers to a navy vessel bringing them to two Australian military bases in New Zealand. From there, the migrants arrived on the soil of New Zealand and Nauru.
This case rises mainly two issues concerning the law of the sea: the duty to give assistance to vessels in distress -an issue discussed below in relation to the high seas -and the application of the right of innocent passage.
Norway, the flag State of the Tampa, invoked a violation of the above-mentioned right of innocent passage, arguing that Australia, refusing entry to its territorial waters, had breached its obligation not to hamper the innocent passage of a vessel, as stated in article 24(1) UN-CLOS. On the other hand Australia declared that the passage violated its domestic law on migration -a field of jurisdiction of the coastal state pursuant to the list of article 19(2) -and thus, pursuant to article 25(1) UNCLOS, it had the right to "take the necessary step in its territorial Moreover, Australia had the right to arrest the Tampa 4 miles from its coast according to article 25(2): "In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject".
From the point of view of the right of innocent passage, Australia seems to have acted lawfully. It did, however, violate the principle of non-refoulement. Australia breached its obligation by redirecting the vessel and refusing to carry out the first screening of the passengers; this amounts to a refoulement de facto. As a matter of fact, to expel a vessel that has entered in the territorial sea violating the domestic immigration law and thereby breaching the condition of the innocent passage, and to oblige it to return to the high seas, is a right of the coastal state. However, this right is not unlimited. Its execution must comply with international obligations and in particular the principle of non-refoulement. It must be noted that the two countries of destination chosen by Australia, i.e. New Zealand and Nauru, present all necessary guarantees of fair treatment and respect of international standards in human rights and asylum law. Yet, the passengers intended to enter Australia. Australia, as first country of arrival, had the duty of temporary refuge and of first screening of the asylum requests. Only afterwards could it have proceeded to transfer the refugees to a safe third state for the final determination of the status and to repel those not eligible.
Similarly, the Cap Anamur, a German vessel owned by the homonym humanitarian organization, rescued on the high seas of the Mediterranean Sea 37 persons on 20 June 2004 and then sailed to the Italian coast of Sicily. At 17 nautical miles from the shore, the Italian authorities ordered the vessel to stop. On 11 July, the master finally received the authorization to enter the territorial waters and to have access to the port, but not yet to disembark. The authorization for the disembarkation arrived only 24 hours after the access to the port. This incident was strongly criticized by the UNHCR 63 and the question of innocent passage arises here in the same way as in the Tampa case.
In the 21 days in which the Cap Anamur could not enter in the Italian waters, a lively debate started between the Home Affair Ministers of Italy, Germany and Malta about which country was responsible for the screening of the asylum requests presented by the irregular passengers 64 . Italy, the coastal state, and Germany, the flag state, argued that Malta, the alleged first port of arrival, was the responsible state pursuant to the criteria of attribution by Council regulation (EC) No. cial traces" 66 and the alleged passage in La Valetta port was grounded on some passengers' testimonies; the logbook pages concerning the days in which this passage should have taken place were mysteriously lacking and the Maltese authorities did not receive any communication about the entry of irregular migrants in their port. Pursuant to article 50 UNCLOS, port waters are part of the internal waters of the coastal state that exercises its full sovereignty there, but the question of the effective control on foreign ships present in ports raises some practical difficulties because a vessel is a self-contained unit and coastal states generally cannot survey in detail all ships entering their internal waters without a well-founded doubt concerning the legality of their presence 67 . Consequently it is difficult to argue that the alleged passage in La Valetta port could consist of an entry into the Maltese territoryeven if the vessel was in its internal waters 68 .
343/2003, of 18 February 2003, Establishing the Criteria and the Mechanisms for Determining the Member State responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National
The Cap Anamur case is also an example for transferring the maritime frontier into the internal waters. The access to the territory, in the meaning of entry in the jurisdiction of the coastal state, may be brought about by the authorized admission to the port waters or by disembarkation. This argument certainly does not apply to vessels participating in smuggling migrants and acting in such a way as to hide the moment of entry and disembarkation. 
The Refusal of Access to Ports and of Disembarkation
Access to the territory is under the exclusive competence of the coastal state which decides on the entry of irregular passengers, evaluating and balancing the interests involved: the protection needed by the individuals, the security of the state or its simple unwillingness. Practice offers some examples of refusal of access to ports and of disembarkation of asylum-seekers -such as the above mentioned Tampa and Cap Anamur cases -in which the masters of the vessels were considered responsible for the passengers because they represented the legal authority on board. Two possible situations have, however, to be distinguished: either the irregular passengers are individuals rescued voluntarily by the vessel; or they are stowaways.
A stowaway is defined by the 1957 Brussels Convention relating to Stowaways which never entered into force, as:
"une personne qui, en un port quelconque ou en un lieu à sa proximité se dissimule dans un navire sans le consentement du propriétaire du navire ou du capitaine ou de toute autre personne ayant la responsabilité du navire et qui est à bord après que le navire a quitté ce port ou ce lieu" (article 1) 69 . Bastid-Burdeau reminds us that the "question de savoir si l'autorité locale peut (…) imposer au capitaine étranger la rétention à bord des passagers clandestins ressortit au seul droit interne" 72 . The refusal of disembarkation of stowaways does not preclude the possibility of redirecting the vessel to another country and, in the Ben Salem et Taznaret case, the destination was left at the discretion of the master. The only limit consists in the principle of non-refoulement to the extent that the stowaways on board are asylum-seekers. The coastal state should then at least ascertain that in the new destination state the individual does not risk being subjected to persecution, torture or other inhuman and degrading treatments.
Moreover, such a case of voluntary redirection cannot be seen as arbitrary detention resulting from the refusal of disembarkation. On the contrary, in the Tampa case, an arbitral detention was found to exist by Australian jurisdiction because the migrants on board, most of them being asylum-seekers, were under the full and exclusive control of the Australian authorities 73 inferred the detention on the basis of an analysis of factual elements, among them that the Australian authorities unilaterally decided where the Tampa could go or not go and that the passengers were completely isolated on board. They were not consulted on the question of their transfer to New Zealand and Nauru. The trial judge thus affirmed that:
"Where complete control over people and their destiny is exercised by others it cannot be said that the opportunity offered by those others is a reasonable escape from the custody in which they were held. The custody simply continues in the form chosen by those detaining the people restrained" (para. 17).
This judgment was then challenged on appeal and the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed the decision and induced several critical opinions 74 . In particular it has to be pointed out that Australia did not comply with its duty deriving from the "first asylum" rule. No debate would have arisen if the coastal authorities had proceeded with the first screening of the passengers and then resettled them to New Zealand and Nauru for the final determination of their status. Because of their de facto detention, Tampa passengers were penalized for their unlawful entry into Australian waters and this is a breach of article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention 75 . In addition, Australia did not fulfill its obligations concerning the safety of life at sea.
Before analyzing the duty to render assistance and the obligation concerning the safety of life, the specificities raised by the contiguous zone require a brief excursion.
IV. The Specificity of the Contiguous Zone
Pursuant to article 33 UNCLOS, in the "contiguous zone", that is the maritime zone adjacent to a state's territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to: "(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea" 76 . The contiguous zone does not exist ipso jure but the coastal state has to proclaim it expressly. It cannot extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines (article 33(2)). The contiguous zone is the only maritime zone not fully under the coastal state's jurisdiction for which UNCLOS provides some explicit powers in the migratory field.
But UNCLOS does not indicate any means for the delimitation of this zone in case of adjacent states separated by less then 48 nautical miles, i.e. the sum of the maximum extension of two facing contiguous zones. Some authors 77 suggest that, considering the administrative nature of the powers attributed to the coastal state by article 33 UN-CLOS, i.e. prevention and repression, these powers may be exercised concurrently by the neighboring states. Thus the question of the delimitation would be redundant 78 . Consequently, the contiguous zones of two states may overlap. This approach is disputable considering, for example, the patrols of a state carried out in a maritime zone under its jurisdiction but also under the jurisdiction of the contiguous state. the contiguous zone cannot be more than 24 miles; it can certainly be less. For these reasons a precise delimitation of the space where coastal state authorities have to perform their function of prevention and repression is preferable and enhances the efficiency and the functional nature of the contiguous zone.
The contiguous zone has an exclusively functional nature 80 as supported by the wording of article 33(1) and the use of "necessary" to qualify the controls that the coastal state may exercise in the listed fields. Controls in migratory issues highlight the contrast between two legal regimes applicable in this maritime zone. On the one hand, the coastal state has the sovereign prerogative to exercise its powers of prevention and repression in relation to violations of its domestic immigration law. On the other hand, the same state must comply with international obligations deriving from the customary principle of nonrefoulement and from the right to seek asylum guaranteed by article 14 UDHR. In this respect, the exercise of the preventive function raises the following problems.
In the contiguous zone the practice of interception and redirection of vessels transporting unlawful migrants, among whom there may well be some asylum-seekers, is encompassed in the prevention powers pursuant to article 33(1)(a). In fact unlawful migration may only be committed upon crossing a national border. At sea this generally corresponds to the external limit of the territorial sea 81 . Any intervention of the authorities in the contiguous zone in such a situation cannot be justified by the attributed repressive powers. The practice of the intercepan act for a country constantly facing unlawful migrants arrival by sea; in particular this would give an incontestable legal basis to competent authorities' operations accomplished beyond the territorial waters. 80 Treves, see note 49, 706, where the author reminds that: "la nature juridique de la zone contiguë est différente de celle de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental. Dans ces dernières zones, l'Etat côtier a des droits souverains et des droits de juridiction (…), tandis que les pouvoirs reconnus sans discussion dans la zone contiguë ne sont que des pouvoirs tion and redirection is not clearly provided for by the wording of the article 82 , but it is not forbidden either.
The key word to identify the limit of the possible actions of the coastal state in the contiguous zone is "necessary". The interception and redirection may be considered lawful when necessary for the protection of interests. Indeed, the protection of a minor interest, as preventing a violation of its migration law, does not justify any kind of intervention. This has already been affirmed in 1935 in the I'm Alone case 83 concerning goods smuggling. Consequently, once the coastal state exercises its jurisdictional powers intercepting and redirecting the vessel, it must consider whether its action may put the passengers of the concerned vessel at risk of persecution, torture or other inhuman treatments. The need of proportionality emerges in relation to the operations accomplished by states authorities on the high seas for contrasting unlawful migration.
V. The Principle of Non-Refoulement put to the Test in Naval Operations on the High Seas
The Freedom of the High Seas and the Safety of Life at Sea
High seas are defined negatively by article 86 UNCLOS as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State". High seas are characterized by the prohibition of appropriation (article 89 UNCLOS) and the freedom of the high seas does not imply the absence of rules but rather indicates that 86 The vessel sailing under the flag of more than one state is considered a vessel without nationality (article 92(2)), and consequently does not enjoy the protection of any state and the freedom of navigation.
cases explicitly provided by the Convention 87 or in accordance with another agreement stating expressly the exception 88 .
Article 98 UNCLOS provides the duty to render assistance in the following terms:
"Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call". (emphasis added)
Even if this article is located in the UNCLOS section concerning the high seas, the duty to render assistance must be considered as applicable in all maritime zones 89 . This rule is closely connected with the principle of safety of life at sea which is the only real limit to the enjoyment of navigation freedom 90 . Consequently, and because of its repetition in treaty and domestic law and of states practice, the duty to render assistance is generally recognized as a principle of customary law.
During the Indochinese crisis, however, the duty to rescue was still considered as a treaty obligation and thus binding only states parties. In particular, two instruments applicable only in the territorial waters were safe practices as any action contrary to the safety of navigation and any action constituting a danger to life or health of persons. Moreover the circular obliges states, and thus vessels sailing under their flag, to render assistance. The undertaking of rescue operations does not exhaust the duty to render assistance which is only fully met after the disembarkation of the rescued people in a place of safety. The disembarkation in a place of safety corresponds to the need to find a place of refuge for the asylum-seekers rescued at sea -again, in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement.
The Respect of the Principle of Non-Refoulement in the Course of Search and Rescue Operations
During the general revision of the IMO SAR system 95 , the MSC faced in particular the question of the place where rescued people disembark, without distinction based on their status, nationality or place of finding. The MSC adopted two resolutions amending both SOLAS Convention 96 and SAR Convention 97 , which entered into force on 1 July 2006, and aimed at guaranteeing assistance to rescued people and to minimize negative consequences for the rescuing ship. Consequently, article 4.1-1 SOLAS Convention has been amended as follows:
"Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships' intended voyage, provided that releasing the master of the ship from the obligations under the current regulation does not further endanger the safety of life at sea. region in which such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases the relevant Contracting Governments shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effective as soon as reasonably practicable". (emphasis added) Similarly, article 3.1.9 SAR Convention now reads:
"Parties shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships' intended voyage, provided that releasing the master of the ship from the obligations does not further endanger the safety of life at sea. The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases, the relevant Parties shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effective as soon as reasonably practicable" (emphasis added).
According to the MSC Guidelines 98 , a "place of safety" means a location where the rescue operations can be considered completed. Pursuant to principle 6.14 of the Guidelines, even the rescue unit can be the place of safety, but only provisionally. In fact the text insists on the role that the flag state and the coastal state should play stepping in for the master of the rescuing vessel 99 . Principle 6.13 provides: "An assisting ship should not be considered a place of safety based solely on the fact that the survivors are no longer in immediate danger once aboard the ship. 99 Stressing the need for co-operation between the flag and the coastal state, the IMO aims at avoiding the repetition of a case such as the Tampa in which "Norway did not want to recognize any flag state responsibility over asylum-seekers. In turn, Australia did not want to assume the entire burden as a coastal state", Baillet, see note 61, 759.
safety, it should be relieved of this responsibility as soon as alternative arrangements can be made".
Moreover the state, in whose SAR zone the operation took place, has the duty to provide or, at least, to secure a place of safety for the rescued people (principle 2.5). In a case such as Tampa, the rescuing vessel could have been considered a provisional place of safety. But the rescue operation could not have been considered completed because of the excessive number of passengers and their sanitary conditions. However, assuming these provisions had been in force at the time of the Tampa case, principles 6.13 and 2.5 could be interpreted as supporting the behavior of Australian authorities which stepped in for the master as soon as they reached an agreement with New Zealand and Nauru. Consequently, they acted in compliance with the duty to render assistance, even if they did not authorize the access into the port.
The MSC Guidelines state:
"The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea" (principle 6.17).
The coastal state shall respect the principle of non-refoulement of asylum-seekers and refugees while performing its duty to safe life at sea. The principle of non-refoulement does not apply only in consideration of the access to territorial waters or ports, but also in the choice of the place of safety, i.e. not only concerning the rejection at the maritime frontier, but also concerning redirection operations, either as the consequence of a rescue operation or of interdiction program.
Recently the IMO elaborated a document entitled "Rescue at Sea, A Guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees" 100 in co-operation with the UNHCR, in which shipmasters are invitedfor cases in which people rescued at sea claim asylum -to "alert the closest RCC (Rescue Co-ordination Centre); contact the UNHCR; [to] not ask for disembarkation in the country of origin or from which the individuals fled; [to] not share personal information regarding the asylum-seekers with the authorities of that country, or with others who might convey this information to those authorities" (page 10). It is regrettable that similar invitations are not repeated in the document con-cerning actions that have to be taken by governments and RCCs (page 11).
The Naval Interdiction Programs and the Problem of Diverting Vessels
Bearing in mind that a definition of interception does not exist in international law and that it can be identified on the basis of state practice, the UNHCR Executive Committee has defined interception "as encompassing all measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination" 101 . The practice of naval interdiction on the high seas consists of the action of one state or more, undertaken on the basis of an international agreement, aimed at exercising the right of visit in relation to criminal activities not listed in article 110 UNCLOS 102 , performed by ships without nationality or by vessels sailing the flag of a state or a group of states. In this latter case, the interested flag state usually participates in the conclusion of the agreement related thereto 103 .
In the migratory field, several interdiction programs have been created to prevent and obstruct irregular flows. The most famous is doubtlessly the United States interdiction program with Haiti because it is the only one which has been brought before of the US Supreme Court con-cerning its legality in relation to the right of asylum, and in particular to the principle of non-refoulement 104 .
On 23 September 1981, the United States concluded an agreement with Haiti, then ruled by President Duvalier, pursuant to which they established "a cooperative program of selective interdiction and return to Haiti of certain Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons coming from Haiti" (emphasis added) 105 . Six days after this agreement US President R. Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12.324 106 suspending the entry of irregular aliens coming from the high seas and ordering the Coast Guard to intercept vessels and to redirect them to their port of origin. Aliens were submitted to the screening process on board the naval unit and those found not eligible for refugee status were sent back to Haiti. Within ten years United States authorities exercised interdiction concerning about 25,000 Haitians 107 .
After the coup against Haitian elected President B. Aristide, on 30 September 1991, arrivals from the island increased and the United States government suspended the interdiction program for a few weeks. On November 1991, interdictions at sea restarted and, because of the ever increasing number of migrants, the US military base of Guantanamo (Cuba) was opened and used as centre for the screening process. On 24 May 1992, US President, G. Bush, adopted Executive Order No.
12.807, known as the "Kennebunkport Order" 108 , suspending the screening process and ordering the Coast Guard to redirect immediately intercepted Haitians. Executive Order No. 12.807 was the basis for the claim against the US administration brought before US jurisdictions by two non-profit organizations defending the interests of Haitian migrants. The proceedings came to an end with the US Supreme Court judgment of 21 June 1993 109 which did not find the actions of the Coast Guards illegal. The Court's reasoning presents several interesting aspects in relation to the interpretation of the principle of nonrefoulement 110 .
First, the US authorities forcibly diverted intercepted vessels to their port of origin, preventing them from the possibility of seeking refuge in other countries of the region, such as Cuba, Jamaica or the Bahamas. In this concern, Judge Blackmun, in his Dissenting Opinion, pointed out that:
"The refugees attempting to escape from Haiti do not claim a right of admission to this country [the United States]. They do not even argue that the Government has no right to intercept their boats. They demand only that the United States, land of refugees and guardian of freedom, cease forcibly driving them to detention, abuse, and death" 111 .
especially vulnerable individuals from persecution. UNHCR's position is also based on the broader human right of refugees to seek asylum from persecution as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" 117 .
The fact that the principle of non-refoulement applies on the high seas does not mean that the interdicting state has to host the intercepted migrants; it has solely not to preclude them from seeking asylum elsewhere and, thus, not to force them back to their country of origin. Consequently to return intercepted refugees vessels to the high seas does not necessarily imply a violation of the principle of nonrefoulement.
Interception practice has become "an ever-expanding array of nonentrée policies which rely on law to deny entry to refugees" 118 and this trend is quite explicitly admitted by the US authorities which affirm "[i]nterdicting migrants at sea means they can be quickly returned to their countries of origin without the costly processes required if they successfully enter the United States" 119 .
European countries are less explicit even if the joint patrols carried out in the Mediterranean sea in the framework of the EU agency Frontex 120 have a modus operandi similar to interdiction programs, but they are called "pre-border operations". According to the Annual Report of the Frontex 121 , it appears that in operations HERA II and HERA III 122 the joint patrols had the task to interdict irregular migrant ships coming from Mauritania and Senegal and then to divert them to their port of origin or, when necessary, to the Canary Islands. European units even 117 had the right to pursue their mission in the territorial waters of these states, thus impeding migrant vessels to leave Mauritanian and Senegalese seas 123 . Moreover, the report affirmed that " [d] uring the operational phase HERA II, 3887 illegal immigrants on 57 Cayucos (small fishing boats) were intercepted close to [the] African coast and diverted". But the same document does not indicate whether the intercepted people were submitted to a screening process by the patrols or in the countries where they were redirected. Moreover, pursuant to the few available data, the migrants were diverted to their port of origin, but it is not possible to find out which port this was.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Several authors were taken aback by the United States practice of interception and redirection at sea in the Caribbean seas, and by the Australian excision of territories, but very little attention has been pointed to the pre-border operations of the EU Member States carried out under the cover of Frontex. But, as demonstrated above, the operational dynamics and the final consequences for the asylum-seekers are precariously similar. The attention of the media and of the interested governments is instead focused on avoiding the arrivals. What is most disappointing is the remaining lack of information and transparency regarding joint patrol operations within the framework of Frontex.
What is known for sure is that migrants screened-in on the EU territory can enjoy fully procedural rights guaranteed by European law; while the unlucky migrants interdicted in the territorial waters of the third state, participating in the program or on high seas, must submit to the domestic law of that state, considered safe by the European institutions.
As in the Tampa case, the practice of forced redirection of asylumseekers violates the right to seek asylum guaranteed by article 14 UDHR and protected by the "temporary refuge" regime and the principle of non-refoulement, whose application in the different maritime 123 At the moment of operation, it appears that Frontex did not have official relations with these two third states. According to the known information, the patrols in their territorial sea were carried on pursuant to two agreements concluded by Spain with Mauritania and Senegal. This raises some questions about the legality of the operations because of the participation of non Spanish units; Trevisanut, see note 104, 381.
zones, even the high seas, could not be challenged once states decide to exercise their sovereign powers, their effective jurisdiction 124 .
However, as noted above, refugee protection and states' interests pursuant to the law of the sea are not completely incompatible. In fact, the principle of safety of life at sea permits guaranteeing to boat people minimum protection standards, which are completed by the non rejection at the frontier dimension of the non-refoulement principle for asylum-seekers. Moreover, "when properly and duly applied, the legal, policy and operational instruments of the institution of asylum and international refugee protection can yield strong dividends for national safety and security" 125 . In this way refugee law can even be a tool for states to encourage border controls to be positively perceived by public opinion and to thereby improve the management of irregular immigration 126 . 124 Hathaway, see note 6, 335; UNCHR, see note 38, para. 43. 125 UNHCR, Background Paper (…) see note 45, para. 13. 126 Hathaway, see note 10, 99-100.
